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FEDERAL JUDICIAL POW ER AND FEDERAL
EQUITY WITHOUT FEDERAL EQUITY POWERS
John Harrison*
This Article discusses the ways in which the federal courts do and do not have
equity powers. Article III courts have the judicial power, which enables them to apply
the law, primary and remedial. Applicable remedial law often includes the law of
equitable remedies, so the federal courts have the power and obligation to give remedies
pursuant to equitable principles. The law of equitable remedies, written and unwritten,
is external to the courts, not created by them, the same way written law is external to
the courts. Because the unwritten law of equitable remedies is found largely in judicial
practice, courts contribute to the development of that law by adding to the body of
practice. That practice is a body of sub-constitutional law, subject to change by Congress
when it exercises one of its enumerated powers. The Constitution neither adopts the
law of equitable remedies nor authorizes the federal courts to make the principles of
equity in the way a legislature creates statutory law. For that reason, the Constitution
in important respects does not confer equitable powers on the courts. These conclusions
have significant implications. First, because the Constitution does not adopt principles
of equity, Framing-era equity practice is not binding law today. That practice, however,
provides important information about Framing-era understandings of judicial power
and cases and controversies. Second, when Congress changes the law of equitable
remedies, it is not invading the judicial power and so is not subject to separation-ofpowers limitations. When Congress has power to adopt the law of remedies but not the
primary legal rule at issue, however, Congress must respect the distinction between
primary and remedial law. Congress may not use its power over remedies to change
primary rules it cannot change directly. Third, the absence of legislative-type power in
the federal courts entails limits on their ability to innovate with respect to equitable
remedies. In order to gain insight into the acceptable degree of judicial innovation, in
contrast with innovation that only a legislature may adopt, the Article discusses several
important Supreme Court cases that developed the law of equitable remedies in public
law litigation.
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long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
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INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have judicial power, and with it administer the
written and unwritten law of equitable remedies. In that sense, they
have equity powers. But in another important sense the federal courts
do not have equity powers under the Constitution. The Constitution
does not itself adopt, incorporate, or receive principles of equity in a
way that would limit Congress’s power to alter those principles. Nor
does the Constitution confer on the federal courts an authority to
recognize or develop the principles of equity that resembles an
independent grant of law-making power. Unwritten principles of
equity are law that is external to the courts and the judicial power, and
is as external and binding on them as is written law like statutes.
This Article sets out and defends the understanding of the
relation between the federal courts and the law of equitable remedies
just described. That understanding has important implications for the
relevance of Framing-era equity practice to the Article III jurisdiction,
for the limits on Congress’s power to alter federal equitable remedies
law, and for the limits on the courts’ authority to innovate with respect
to the unwritten law of equitable remedies. Those implications follow
from the status of the law of equitable remedies as a body of subconstitutional principles that the courts find and that they make only
in a limited sense, a sense that brings with it important restrictions.
Section I elaborates on the basic thesis of the Article. That Section
briefly describes the argument about equity powers that I reject, then
shows why equitable remedies are the subject of a body of law that the
courts apply, as they apply other bodies of law. As I also explain, the
reference to equity in Article III is consistent with equity’s status as
external, sub-constitutional law.
Section II turns to a topic of longstanding and current interest:
the significance for constitutional purposes of equity practice from the
time the Constitution was adopted. Because the Constitution itself
does not incorporate principles of equity, those principles are not
fixed as of the time of the Framing. Framing-era equity practice is
nevertheless important because it provides substantial information
about Framing-era understanding of cases and controversies and
judicial power.
Section III addresses Congress’s authority to make and change the
law of equitable remedies. That authority is limited, but the limits do
not come from separation of power. When Congress adopts a new rule
about equitable remedies, it is not invading the judicial power. The
federal courts do not have equity powers that resist invasion the way
the President’s pardon power resists invasion by Congress, for
example. Limits arise because some of Congress’s powers extend to
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remedies but not to the primary rule that remedies enforce. When
Congress exercises one of those powers, it is limited by the principle
that power over a remedy is not power over the rule being enforced.
Congress must respect that principle when it enforces the
constitutional amendments that confer enforcement powers, and
when it provides the federal courts with remedial principles that the
courts apply to primary law that Congress does not make.
Section IV discusses the extent to which the federal courts may
permissibly innovate in the field of equitable remedies. Although
courts do not make or alter the unwritten law through legislative-type
acts, they do make and alter it in the process of developing it and
applying it to new circumstances. In order to supply an improved
understanding of the Supreme Court’s practice of innovation, and the
steps that are acceptably limited as opposed to those that are
controversially large, I examine several leading twentieth-century
Supreme Court cases that are landmarks in federal equity. To sharpen
the analysis, I identify three fundamental aspects of cases involving
equitable remedies: the configuration of parties and interests, the
interest that supports that plaintiff’s claim to relief, and the discretion
courts exercise in formulating decrees, especially decrees that control
the conduct of the government. I argue that most of the innovations
found in those important cases were comparatively modest. The three
largest changes, I suggest, remain somewhat controversial and so give
some indication of the limits of acceptable change by the judiciary.
That examination of practice helps prick out the line between the
relatively small steps that courts may take and larger steps that must be
left for legislative action.
I.

HOW ARTICLE III COURTS ADMINISTER EQUITY WITHOUT HAVING
EQUITY POWERS

This Part argues that Article III courts do not have equity powers,
with equity powers defined in a way set out in Section A. Section B
then explains why the federal courts lack such powers but administer
federal equity by treating it as a source of binding norms that are
external to them in the same way the Constitution and statutes are.
Section B elaborates on the conception of courts as transparent to
external law, including remedies law; shows how the Constitution
adopts that conception for the federal courts; and explains that the
references to equity in the Constitution do not undermine that
conclusion. Section B concludes by assembling the components set
out previously into a brief statement of the relation between judicial
power and equity powers, and the way in which federal courts do and
do not have the latter because they have the former.
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A. Equity Powers and the Possibility That Equity Is Adopted by Article III or
Generated by Judicial Acts of Legislation
This Article rejects one view of federal equity and federal equity
powers. According to that view, the source of the equitable principles
that federal courts apply is ultimately the Constitution. Either the
Constitution itself adopts principles of equity, or it empowers the
courts to adopt them much as Congress makes statutes.
Those two possible sources are familiar from debates over the
federal common law. In the Founding-era debate on that subject, the
theory that the Constitution itself received the common law was raised
but rejected.1 Much more recently, the idea that the common law is
the product of judicial legislation that is much like legislative
legislation has become widespread.2 The common-law powers of the
federal courts have been debated in those terms, and thus on the
assumption that the federal courts have or might have the authority to
generate common law as a legislature generates statutes.3 That way of
thinking about the common law can be applied to equity.
B. The Federal Courts as Transparent to Principles of Equity That They
Find but Do Not Make
This Section shows that the Constitution assumes that equity is a
body of legal norms that is external to the courts the way statutes are.
The federal courts administer the principles of equitable remedies
and, insofar as those principles remain unwritten, contribute to the
principles’ development by their decisions. Article III does not contain
those principles, and the courts it creates do not make the principles
of equity the way a legislature makes statutory law.
1. The Relations Between Courts and Legal Principles That Are
External to Them
This Article explicates a familiar, perhaps seemingly simpleminded, understanding of the relationship between the courts and the

1 See Stewart Jay, Essay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV
1003, 1088 (1985) (discussing the claim in the 1790s that the Constitution made the
common law applicable throughout the United States).
2 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, NW. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (endorsing
as “the true position” the view that “there are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning
of federal rules of decision” by judges).
3 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1985) (assessing claims of law-making power by the federal courts on the assumption that
judicial law making closely resembles legislative law making).
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law. According to that understanding, the law is external to the courts.
Courts take legal rules as inputs in performing their function and are
in a sense transparent to the law. That relationship is easiest to grasp
with respect to legal rules that directly govern the rights, duties, and
other relations of private people. Promisors on contracts have
obligations to perform and promisees have correlative rights to
performance. That relationship is created by the law and exists
whether or not any court has reason to inquire into it. When they
decide contract cases, courts identify the parties’ preexisting relations
and decide accordingly.
Just as rules of primary law can be external to the courts, so can
the law of remedies. The connection between courts and remedies law
is perhaps closer than that between courts and primary law, so it is
important to see how remedies law too can be given to, not created by,
the courts.
A remedy is a legally binding step taken by the court that is
designed to bring the parties’ actual positions into conformity with the
requirements of the law. A damages judgment is designed to restore
the wealth of the plaintiff that was lost by the wrongdoing of the
defendant. A preventive injunction against a tort is designed to keep
the tort from happening and thereby keep the defendant from moving
the plaintiff away from the plaintiff’s rightful position. Rightful
positions are determined by the primary legal rules, which directly
govern the parties, not the courts. Contract damages and specific
performance serve to restore or maintain the promisee’s rightful
position as defined by the contract, which itself is primary law.4
When a court gives a remedy, it exercises legal power. Damages
judgments and injunctions create new obligations for the defendant.
Creating an obligation is an exercise of power.5 Statutes that impose
duties of conduct do so through exercises of legislative power. When
courts issue injunctions, they too create duties concerning conduct
and do so by exercising power. Courts do not have legislative power,
so their ability to bring about a change in parties’ legal positions
requires the exercise of some other power. The ability to bring about
a change by giving a remedy is remedial power. The power conferred

4 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES
MATERIALS 1, 14–15 (5th ed. 2019) (describing the difference between primary and
remedial law, and the function of remedies as restoration of the plaintiffs’ rightful
position).
5 Courts are not limited to remedies that change legal positions. A court can also
decide on the already-existing legal positions of the parties, and make that decision binding
on the parties through a declaratory judgment.
AND
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by Article III is the judicial power, which enables courts to give
remedies.6
When courts give remedies, they implement the law of remedies.
Remedies law, like the primary law of contract, is abstract, although a
remedy in a case is concrete. The principle that specific performance
can be given in response to a prior or threatened breach of contract is
part of the law of remedies. Remedies law tells courts which remedies
they may give and when to give them. Although that law to some extent
empowers the courts, by pointing out the remedial steps that may be
taken, it also binds them as the primary law does. If a remedy is
mandatory, for example, a court must give it. Insofar as the law of
remedies sets out the criteria that guide discretionary decisions, a court
must use those criteria. Remedies law is as external to the courts as is
statutory law or the law of contract.
That understanding of remedies law, and equitable remedies law,
as external to the courts is familiar to students of equity. The status of
equity as a body of principles adumbrated by the courts of many
jurisdictions but not associated specifically with any one jurisdiction is
visible in the title of the first great American equity treatise. In 1836,
Justice Story published Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, As
Administered in England and America.7 In the preface, Story explained
that he sought to “bring together some of the more general elements
of the System of Equity Jurisprudence, as administered in England and
America.”8 He referred to a single system of jurisprudence, not one at
London and another at Washington and a third at Dover, Delaware.
To say that law is external to the courts and not the product of
judicial law creation is not to deny that courts make law in the sense of
taking policy into account. Courts routinely point to policy considerations in applying statutes, and no doubt often consider their own views
of sound policy, as they would if they were members of a legislature.9
But a court that makes legislative-type judgments in that sense does not
engage in law production the way a legislature does.
Just as judicial consideration of policy does not imply that courts
create legal rules, neither does the practice of following precedent. In
a practical sense, a court that sets a binding precedent has made law.

6
7

U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836).
8 Id. at v.
9 See, e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1661–62 (2021) (Barrett, J.)
(looking to the undesirable consequences of a reading of the statute as grounds to reject
that reading).
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Later decisionmakers will follow the court’s decision, even if that decision conflicts with the view of the law’s content they otherwise would
take.10 The practice of following stare decisis for statutory decisions,
however, shows that setting precedents is distinct from law creation as
done by the legislature. Statutory precedents are about statutes and
presuppose a statute that can be expounded authoritatively.
Seeing legal rules as external to the courts is easiest with respect
to statutes and other written law, like the Constitution. When the law
is a writing produced by a process other than adjudication, its content
can be separated from what the courts do with it. Judicial gloss on a
statute is readily seen as gloss—as commentary and explanation that is
about a text and thus distinct from the text. Matters are more
complicated when the law is unwritten, and especially when courts find
it in part by reading earlier judicial decisions. Much of federal equity
remains unwritten, so the relationship between the courts and
unwritten law is central to this Article.
Unwritten law can be external to the courts just as written law can
be. Custom and practice are a leading form of unwritten law. When
the authoritative custom and practice is not that of the courts
themselves, courts that follow it look to an external source. Merchant
practice, for example, is found by learning about the activities of
merchants and the principles that guide those activities.11
When courts treat custom and practice as authoritative, they often
regard their own prior decisions as the relevant practice. A court that
contributes to the authoritative body of decision is making law in a way,
just as a commodities broker can contribute to an authoritative body
of merchant practice. Even that kind of judicial law making is very
different from legislation. First, a court deciding according to judicial
custom looks to an external source. That source may include the
court’s or the judges’ own earlier decisions, but at the point of decision
those earlier decisions are fixed. Second, the contribution of any one
case, even one that becomes a leading case, is just one point in the
pattern. Stare decisis may make a highest court’s leading case binding,
but that effect comes from stare decisis, not from deciding according
to judicial practice.

10 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987) (to treat a prior
decision as precedent is to treat it as significant for the current decision even if the current
court regards the prior decision as erroneous).
11 See Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208,
213–14 (2013) (describing the use by the Court of King’s Bench under Chief Justice
Mansfield of special juries composed of merchants to identify merchant practice and apply
it to commercial cases).
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A legislature, in contrast to a court, is not bound by its earlier
decisions. Much of the work of legislatures is to revise existing statutes.12 And when a legislature adopts a new statute, that statute is not
just one episode in the development of a practice. The new statute is
authoritative, and can wipe away all that has gone before.
Courts thus decide according to rules about their own jurisdiction
and procedure, and rules about the remedies they give, just as they
decide according to rules that govern the parties’ primary legal
relations.13
2. The Constitution and the Relation Between Article III Courts and
the Law
This subsection shows that the Constitution assumes that the
federal courts have the relation to the law just described. Those courts
decide cases under legal principles that they take as given and do not
create.
Seeing the courts as deciding according to law that is given to
them is familiar, perhaps naïve. Because that conception of courts is
so commonplace, finding it in the Constitution would not be
surprising. The Drafters took for granted features of the different
institutions of government that were familiar when it was framed. They
were not seeking to develop new conceptions of legislative, executive,
and judicial power. The assumptions on which they worked with
respect to those powers, which are manifested in the document, were
assumptions about legislatures, executive institutions, and courts in
general.

12 The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, for example, were described as the
product of “one of the longest—and hardest fought—legislative battles in recent
congressional history” by a representative who was a leading participant in drafting and
adopting those changes to existing statutory law. Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENV’T L. 1721, 1723 (1991). In the years leading up to the
amendments, “thousands of hours were spent developing, debating, and blocking
legislative proposals,” and “millions of dollars were spent on lobbying by interest groups.”
Id.
13 The conception of courts and judicial power as transparent to the law corresponds
to a similar conception of executive power. Executive officials carry out the law, which they
do not create. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2019) (arguing that the Article II executive
power is an “empty vessel” awaiting laws requiring execution that would fill it). The
executive is the conduit through which the abstract requirements of the law are turned into
practical activities, from operating post offices to arresting criminal suspects. In similar
fashion, courts are the conduit through which the abstract requirements of the law are
authoritatively applied to concrete disputes.
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A leading example of the relationship between courts and the law
appears at the beginning of the jurisdictional list in Article III. Article
III provides that the “judicial Power of the United States shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties” already made and yet to be
made.14 The Constitution and treaties are written law, produced by a
process that does not involve the courts.15 Federal statutes, which are
laws of the United States, are written law created by another process
that does not involve the courts.16
Article III’s list thus shows that courts sometimes decide according
to norms that they do not produce the way Congress, the treaty-making
process, and the Constitution-making process produce written law.
Another part of Article III provides examples of legal rules with a
source external to the courts that bind the courts with respect to their
own operations. The Treason Clause includes primary law, procedural
law, and remedies law. It defines treason, and thereby lays down a rule
of primary conduct.17 The Clause also lays down a rule of evidence,
providing that treason convictions require either confession in open
court or the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act.18
And the Clause limits the remedy for treason, ruling out corruption of
blood and forfeiture beyond the life of the traitor.19 That written law
can govern judicial procedure and remedies may seem a proposition
too obvious to need confirmation, but in any event the Constitution
confirms it.
3. The Constitution’s References to Equity
Article III mentions “equity,” but the appearance of that word
neither incorporates equity into American law nor authorizes the
courts to create or amend equity principles through acts that resemble
those of a legislature rather than a court that works with a body of
unwritten law.
Article III refers to equity once. It extends the judicial power to
“all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15 See id. art. V (setting out process for adopting and amending the Constitution); id.
art. II, § 2 (setting out the process for making treaties).
16 See id. art. I, § 7 (setting out process for making federal laws).
17 Id. art. III, § 3 (defining treason).
18 Id. (requiring the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in
open court, for conviction of treason).
19 Id. (providing that Congress may declare the punishment for treason but that
attainder of treason shall not work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life
of the person convicted).
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Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority.”20 The suggestion that the Constitution thereby
adopts equity as it stood in 1788 cannot be sustained. If Article III
incorporates equity, it even more clearly incorporates admiralty law.
Shortly after conferring the federal-question jurisdiction, Article III
extends the judicial power to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction.”21 The admiralty head of jurisdiction is defined by that
body of law, whereas the federal-question jurisdiction is defined by
federal law, not equity. The admiralty jurisdiction is thus tied to the
substance of admiralty law more closely than the federal-question
jurisdiction is tied to the substance of equity. But at the time of the
Framing and for more than a century, admiralty law was understood as
a body of customary law that was shared by maritime nations
generally.22 Just as admiralty law was an unwritten body of principles
to which Article III points but that it does not create or adopt, so is
equity.
Besides not adopting equity, Article III’s reference to it does not
empower the courts to change the principles of equity through
legislative-type acts. That reference cannot be the source of lawmaking authority tied to the judicial power because it covers only the
federal-question jurisdiction. Article III signals that limited coverage
in two ways. First, the last of the case-denominated heads of jurisdiction, admiralty, is itself defined by a body of norms as is the federalquestion jurisdiction. That reference to another body of law defeats
any inference that the entire list is governed by the initial mention of
law and equity as to federal-question cases. Second, the list has another
discontinuity. It switches from cases to controversies, and none of the
controversy-denominated heads of jurisdiction mentions equity.23
That absence is especially striking because in the early decades under
the Constitution, federal equity developed mainly in diversity, a
controversy-denominated head. Federal courts thus readily exercised
equity jurisdiction, and adumbrated equity principles, in cases to
which the mention of equity was not relevant. That mention cannot

20 Id. § 2.
21 Id. (extending judicial power to admiralty and maritime cases).
22 The fundamental contemporary work on the status of admiralty as non-federal
general law, and the status of general law in the American legal system, is William A.
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
23 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (setting out three categories of “cases” to which the
judicial power extends and then listing categories of “controversies” to which the power
extends).
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be the source of their authority to decide according to, and shape,
equity.
Mentioning law and equity in the federal-question jurisdiction
performed an important but more modest function.24 Doing so
emphasized that the grant was comprehensive. By resting federalquestion jurisdiction on the substantive law to be applied, the Framers
raised a question. How did that way of defining jurisdiction interact
with the division of authority between the courts of law and equity that
was familiar from English practice? Law and equity might themselves
have been seen as distinct bodies of substantive law.25 The answer was
to clarify that the institutional divisions found in the English system did
not matter, so that the new federal courts’ jurisdiction based on the
substance of the law being applied was comprehensive. The question
concerning a head of jurisdiction based on the substance of the rules
being applied did not arise with respect to other heads of jurisdiction,
other than admiralty, which are not so defined. Confirmation that the
reference to law and equity was by way of clarification appears in the
judiciary provision prepared by the Federal Convention’s Committee
of Detail. That draft of the Constitution does not mention law and
equity.26 The Committee apparently took that point for granted.27 .

24 A grant of jurisdiction in equity can be a limit on a court’s powers. At the time of
the Framing, equity courts gave only equitable and not legal remedies. Had Congress
decided to have a wholly divided lower-court bench, it could have given federal equity courts
jurisdiction only in equity. It has never done that. The one court the Constitution itself
establishes, the Supreme Court of the United States, is a court of law, equity, and admiralty.
The Federal Convention considered separate supreme courts of law, equity, and admiralty,
but decided instead to establish one highest court. See Trump v. Hawaii. 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2424–28 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
25 The possibility that law and equity might have been seen as distinct bodies of
substantive law was one reason Blackstone went to considerable length to argue that the
difference between the two sets of courts concerned their procedures and remedies, not
the substance of the legal principles they applied. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*436–38 (arguing that law and equity courts share a “parity of law and reason” and are
distinguished by “the different modes of administ[e]ring justice in each”).
26 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 186–87 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (extending federal jurisdiction to a list of cases, some defined by the substantive
law to be applied, such as “all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the
United States,” without mentioning law or equity in any of the heads of jurisdiction).
27 The Committee of Detail consisted of John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph,
Nathaniel Gorham, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Wilson. Id. at 97 (listing members of the
Committee of Detail). The Committee had considerable legal sophistication; three of its
members—Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Wilson—later would serve on the Supreme Court of
the United States. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 3–4 (1985) (listing Rutledge, Wilson, and Ellsworth
as Justices). Randolph served as Attorney General under Washington. See DAVID P. CURRIE,
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4. Judicial Power and Equitable Power
I now bring the threads together and explain how the federal
courts do and do not have equity powers. They have judicial power,
which enables them to decide under the applicable law. When
remedies law applies, it calls for courts to take steps that change legal
relations. Those steps are taken with judicial power. With the same
power, courts conclusively apply primary law that comes from the
Constitution, federal statutes, treaties, state law, or foreign law.
Judicial power enables courts to decide cases and take all the steps
needed to do so. Possessing judicial power, courts have the authority
to give remedies, including equitable remedies. In that sense and only
that sense do they have equitable powers.
From the beginning, the federal courts have assumed that their
remedial authority includes giving the remedies known to the
unwritten principles of equity as those principles existed when the
federal courts began and have been developed since. Unwritten
federal equity is thus part of the body of norms, external to the courts,
that they apply using judicial power. That is the situation that the
federal courts describe when they say that they have equitable powers.
In saying so, they are correct.
But the statement that federal courts have equity powers is not
correct if taken to mean that their remedial authority has some source
other than the unwritten law as modified by statute and other sources
of binding norms
II.

THE RELEVANCE AND IRRELEVANCE OF FRAMING-ERA EQUITY

One current debate concerns what might be called equity
originalism. The debate turns on the relevance today of the content
that equity had when the Constitution was adopted. An example of
the issues and their importance relates to so-called universal injunctions—injunctions that affect the defendant’s conduct with respect to
everyone, not only the parties before the court. One argument against
universal injunctions is that they were unknown at the time of the
Framing, that the Constitution adopts the principles of equity as they
stood when it was adopted, and that therefore federal courts have no
authority to give that relief.28

THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 154 n.168 (1997)
(referring to Randolph as the Attorney General).
28 Justice Thomas expressed doubts about universal injunctions, on grounds related
to equity as it stood at the time of the Framing, without conclusively taking a position on
the question, in a concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–28 (2018)
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The status of equity as a body of norms that are neither found in
the Constitution nor made by the courts has implications for the
significance of equity’s content when the Constitution was adopted. I
discuss two. Equity as it stood at the time of the Framing is irrelevant
in one respect but relevant in another.
A. The Status of Equity as Sub-Constitutional Law and Equity Originalism
One criticism of innovations in equitable remedies, such as
universal injunctions insofar as they are innovations, is that the content
of equity was fixed when the Constitution was adopted and does not
allow for innovation. The major premise of that argument—that rules
fixed by the Constitution may not be changed by legislatures or
courts—is of course correct. But the minor premise—that equitable
principles were fixed by the Constitution—is not correct.29
As this Article has explained, equity was a body of unwritten law
when the Constitution was adopted. Article III did not enact equity
any more than it enacted the common law. Equitable remedies
principles had the same place in the legal hierarchy as the general law
merchant and the law of admiralty. Those principles could be changed
by exercises of legislative power. To the extent that courts may develop
equitable principles through their decisions, they were free to do so.
B. Framing-Era Equity and the Article III Judicial Power
Framing-era equity nevertheless bears on important constitutional
issues concerning Article III. Article III does not adopt the principles
of equity or empower courts to do so. Rather, Article III extends
federal judicial power to listed cases and controversies.30 According to
longstanding interpretation, Article III thereby limits the courts it
empowers. They may exercise only judicial power, and may do so only
by deciding the kinds of proceedings that qualify as cases or

(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing difficulties raised by the arguable departure of
universal injunctions from Framing-era equity practice).
29 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., treats the content of equity at the time of the Framing as imposing limits
on permissible judicial innovation in equity, 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) (stating that equitable
“flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief”), but
distinguishes the courts’ authority to innovate from that of Congress. Id. at 329 (leaving
“any substantial expansion of past practice to Congress.”).
30 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
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controversies. If a court is asked to decide a legal issue in some other
kind of proceeding, it may not do so.31
Like many concepts, cases and controversies and judicial power
are in part understood inductively. Established examples of the
concept perform two functions in understanding the abstractions
involved. First, an established example is presumptively within the concept. Second, generalization from the common features of familiar
instances provides information about the abstract concept and its
limits.
When Article III was adopted, many forms of legal proceeding
were familiar and hence recognized as cases or controversies subject to
judicial power. Equity proceedings were a major part of that body of
recognized exercises of judicial power.32 Framing-era equity thus
provides examples that figure in fleshing out the abstract terms the
Constitution uses.
The current debate over so-called universal injunctions provides
an example of the bearing of Framing-era equity on the meaning of
Article III. A universal injunction is one that controls the defendant’s
behavior as to everyone, not only the plaintiff or plaintiffs.33 The
primary constitutional objection to universal injunctions is that
because courts resolve cases and controversies between parties,
remedies must be confined to parties. One response is that when the
Constitution was adopted, forms of universal injunctions were
available. Bills of peace, for example, are argued to have been
equitable relief to non-parties.34 A counter response is that bills of
peace were a precursor of today’s class actions, in which the number
of parties can be large but relief runs only to parties.35
In understanding Article III on the issue of universal injunctions,
both presence and absence at the time of the Framing can matter. A
Framing-era equitable practice that constitutes a universal injunction
as understood today—which bills of peace may or may not—would be
strong evidence that the relevant concepts included universal
injunctions. Inference from absence is less direct, but also possible. If

31 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (stating that the case or controversy
requirement of Article III is a source of constitutional jurisdictional limitations such as the
requirement of standing).
32 Trump v. Hawaii. 138 S. Ct. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring).
33 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 417, 419 n.5 (2017).
34 See Brief of Respondent at 79, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965)
(pointing to bills of peace as Framing-era equity practice similar to universal injunctions).
35 See Bray, supra note 33, at 426 (arguing that bills of peace are analogous to today’s
class actions, not universal injunctions).
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the equitable remedies that were familiar in the late eighteenth
century have a common feature, induction from that common feature
to the abstract concepts is reasonable. A common feature of being
party specific, if found in then-established equitable remedies, would
support the inference that party specificity is a component of the
abstract concepts of cases and controversies.
Equity practice from the time of the Framing thus can provide
significant information about the content of Article III, even though
that content does not include the principles of equity themselves.
III.

CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE LAW OF REMEDIES AND
THE LIMITS OF THAT AUTHORITY

A correct understanding of federal equity has implications for
congressional power concerning federal remedies law. That power is
constrained, but the constraints do not come from separation of
powers. Rather, the constraints come from the relations between
primary law and the law of remedies.
If the Constitution itself incorporated or adopted the principles
of equity, then Congress’s power over federal equitable remedies
would be limited. Congress cannot alter legal rules that come from
the Constitution. Congress cannot change the term of senators from
six to eight years. And even if the intrinsic flexibility of equity allows
some congressional development of principles that the Constitution
itself adopts, that development would be limited to the basic contours
the Constitution sets out. In similar fashion, if the Constitution conferred equity-making power on the courts, Congress would not be able
to override the courts’ exercises of that power. Congress cannot
countermand the exercise of powers vested elsewhere by the
Constitution. Congress cannot, for example, decide who may and who
may not receive a pardon.36 The President makes those decisions.
As explained above, the Constitution does not incorporate equity,
nor does it empower the courts to make equity principles the way it
empowers Congress to legislate and the President to grant pardons.
When Congress legislates concerning equitable remedies in federal
court, it does not seek impermissibly to modify rules created by the
Constitution, nor does it trench on another branch’s power.
Congress’s power over federal equity nevertheless is significantly
limited, because it sometimes is a power only over remedies and not
the primary rule. Congressional power to legislate concerning remedies in federal court has three main sources. First, Congress sometimes
36 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (13 Wall. 1872) (holding that Congress may
not undo the effect of a presidential pardon).
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has the power to choose the primary rule, as for example when it
regulates commerce.37 Second, several constitutional amendments lay
down rules and give Congress power to enforce them.38 Third, under
the so-called horizontal scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Congress has power to supply the law of remedies the federal courts
use.39
In the latter two categories, Congress has power over the remedy
but not over the primary rule. The Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude is not subject to congressional
modification, but Congress has power to enforce it.40 Many cases in
federal court turn on primary law that Congress does not control,
notably the Constitution and state law, but Congress can supply the
applicable law of remedies.
Congress’s remedy-only powers pose a danger of improper
expansion of congressional authority, but not an expansion into zones
of decision exclusively within the judicial power. Rather, the danger
arises because a power over the remedy can in practice amount to a
power over the content of the primary rule. As Holmes’s Bad Man
understands, if the only remedy for breach of contract is expectation
damages, promisors in effect have an option to perform or pay, and
not a duty to perform.41 As Holmes of course understood, prospective
injunctions have practical effects that are different from the effects of
the retrospective monetary remedies characteristically given at law.42
Prospective injunctions closely resemble primary duties of conduct:
they direct the defendant to take specified actions, and are backed by
the threat of punitive and not only compensatory sanctions via
contempt.43 As a result, an injunction can for practical purposes
amount to a substitute for the primary rule it enforces.

37 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to regulate commerce).
38 See, e.g., id. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enforce the
amendment through appropriate legislation).
39 See id. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power to make all laws necessary and proper to
carry into execution its own powers and those of other departments of the federal
government).
40 See id. amend. XIII.
41 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897)
(explaining that to the bad man “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else”).
42 When Holmes referred to the duty to keep a contract “at common law,” he spoke
with his characteristic precision and brevity. He was not talking about specific performance.
Id.
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 402 (2018) (making violation of a federal court’s order the crime of
contempt).
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An instructive illustration of the problem of blurring the line
between power over remedies and power over primary law comes from
one of the three companion cases to Brown v. Board of Education.44 In
Belton v. Gebhart,45 the nation’s preeminent equity tribunal rejected
school segregation without rejecting the principle of primary law that
separate but equal education was constitutional.46 Chancellor Seitz
concluded that the only way to ensure education of equal quality for
all students was to desegregate the Delaware schools. He therefore
entered a remedial order directing the creation of unitary school
systems.47 The Chancellor took equal educational quality as the plaintiffs’ rightful position and devised a remedy that would achieve that
position. In Seitz’s view, ending segregation was the only way to
achieve the rightful position.48 The Court of Chancery thus in effect
resolved the great issue of the constitutionality of separate-but-equal
schools while rejecting separation only through the remedy, not in the
primary rule. Power over the remedy can amount to power over the
rule.
Another example of how power over the remedy can amount to
power over the primary rule comes from the nineteenth century. In
Belton, the law of remedies can be said to have expanded a primary
right. In the previous century, a major issue under the Contracts
Clause was the danger that the law of remedies might be used in effect
to contract primary rights. Under the Contracts Clause, states may not
pass laws that “impair[] the Obligation of Contracts.”49 Even before
Holmes, judges and lawyers understood human nature well enough to
know that the obligation of a contract is found in the remedies as well
as the primary duty to perform. When states abolished imprisonment
for debt, some creditors objected that their debtors’ obligations had
been impaired because the remaining remedies were substantially
weaker.50 The Supreme Court found that some legislative changes in
remedies might amount to impairments, but that the elimination of
imprisonment for debt did not do so.51 Strong enough remedies
44 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952), aff’d, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
46 Id. at 869–70.
47 Id. at 868, 871 (requiring desegregation as a remedy for inequality and rejecting a
remedy that would be limited to equalization).
48 Id. at 871.
49 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10 (providing that no state shall pass any law “impairing the
Obligation of Contracts”).
50 See Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 372 (1827).
51 See id. at 381 (finding that release of debtors from prison operates only on the
remedy, and only on part of the remedy, and does not impair the obligation of the
contract).
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remained to enforce debtors’ primary obligations. Some effective
remedy had to be available, because of the close connection between
right and remedy.52
Belton and the debtors’ prison cases did not involve congressional
power over remedies, but similar problems can arise when Congress
has power over the remedy and not over the primary rule. In cases like
Katzenbach v. Morgan53 and City of Boerne v. Flores,54 the danger is that
Congress is using its enforcement power in effect to change a
constitutional rule. Congress has no power over the substance of the
Constitution.
The Constitution is not the only body of law that Congress has no
power to modify. Rights created under state law are subject to congressional control only to the extent the Constitution grants Congress
power to affect those rights. Were Congress to change the law of
remedies in federal court by eliminating an important contract remedy
in diversity cases with state-law contract rights at issue, the danger
would be that it was in effect changing state-law private rights over
which Congress has no power. Congress may neither expand nor
contract rights created by the Constitution, and in the absence of an
enumerated power over the law at issue, it may neither expand nor
contract private rights created by state law.
When Congress has power over the remedy but not the primary
rule, any threat is to the principle of enumerated powers, which has an
important federalism component, and to the legal advantages created
and protected by sources of law that Congress has no power to change.
The threat is not to the judicial power.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,55 from 2021, provides a useful
example of the issues connected with changes in the law of remedies
that have important effects on primary legal positions. In its S.B. 8
statute, Texas undertook to eliminate a familiar remedy: the
anticipatory suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, brought by a
regulated party against an enforcement official, designed to raise the
constitutional issues that would arise with the parties reversed in an

52 See Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 316 (1843) (discussing the line between
permissibly changing remedies and impermissibly impairing the obligation of a contract).
53 384 U.S. 641, 64859 (1966) (approving a broad rule enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment).
54 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act had
gone beyond enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and had impermissibly changed the
primary rule).
55 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
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enforcement proceeding.56 As the Supreme Court has explained,
preenforcement review of that kind is a very useful remedy. If they can
bring anticipatory proceedings, regulated parties can avoid the risk
associated with violating an arguably unconstitutional rule and raising
their defense as enforcement defendants.57 The risk is that the rule
will be found constitutional and a sanction imposed. In light of that
risk, regulated parties might comply with an unconstitutional rule,
which then would never come before the courts.58
The limits of congressional power over remedies alone would
matter were Congress to restrict anticipatory proceedings in federal
court in constitutional cases or cases governed wholly by state law. I
will not offer a full treatment of that issue here, but will seek to identify
a crucial question, one that goes to the heart of equity and federal
equity. The question is whether the Ex parte Young-type anticipatory
proceeding is always an additional remedy that goes beyond the Constitution’s requirements, or is sometimes constitutionally mandatory.59 I
will briefly sketch the argument that the remedy is discretionary and
the argument that it is constitutionally mandatory.
Ex parte Young itself uses standard equitable analysis, and thereby
illustrates how its anticipatory remedy can be seen as additional and
not required. In Young, the regulated parties were railroads subject to
a rate regulation adopted by the Minnesota legislature that was
enforced with strong penalties if it was violated.60 As with Texas’s S.B.
8, one goal of Minnesota’s strong penalties was to keep the railroads
from violating the regulation and raising a constitutional defense in an
enforcement proceeding.61 As Justice Peckham explained in Young,
that defense was the equity plaintiffs’ remedy at law.62 The dangers of
violating and defending made that remedy inadequate, and justified
an injunction that would obviate the need to violate the rate
regulation.63

56 See id. at 530–31 (describing the enforcement system for S.B. 8, the Texas regulation
of abortion at issue).
57 See Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967).
58 See id. (explaining that preenforcement review of regulations allows regulated
parties to avoid the choice between complying with the rule and violating it and running
the risk of penalties).
59 The Court approved anticipatory injunctive proceedings raising a constitutional
challenge to a regulatory statute in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908).
60 See id. at 127–29.
61 See id. at 141.
62 See id. at 141–42.
63 See id. at 163–65 (finding that the inadequacy of the remedy at law of violating the
regulation and defending in an enforcement proceeding justified equitable relief).
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The argument that Young-type injunctions are never constitutionally required relates to their equitable character. Equity is a distinct
body of principles, not itself found in the Constitution, that provide
additional support for legal advantages, support that goes beyond the
minimum that is otherwise available. When the Constitution protects
liberty of conduct, the Constitution supplies its own baseline remedy.
Unconstitutional rules about conduct are legally inoperative, and are
to be recognized as such by any court that decides a case in which the
rule is relevant. That baseline remedy is at work in enforcement
proceedings, in which unconstitutional rules are disregarded.64
Whether equity gives additional remedies that go beyond the baseline
depends on the content of equity, not the Constitution. Because
Congress controls that content of remedial equity in federal court, it
may decide that anticipatory remedies are undesirable despite their
benefits, and limit their availability. Congress may exercise wholesale
the discretion that the Court in Young, applying equitable principles,
exercised retail.
The argument that Young-type injunctions are sometimes
constitutionally required works by likening constitutional protections
of liberty of conduct to constitutional protections of private rights of
property and contract. The Court’s nineteenth-century cases about
contract remedies assume that the obligation of contracts includes not
only the primary rules that require promisors to perform, but also an
entitlement of promisees to an effective remedy.65 With the protected
legal interest so defined, a change in the law of remedies can be an
impermissible contraction of that interest—an impairment of the
obligation of a contract. The argument that Young-type injunctions are
sometimes constitutionally mandatory attributes a similar remedial
component to constitutionally protected liberty of conduct. Not only
are people legally immune from unconstitutional rules about what
they may do, the reasoning goes, they are also constitutionally entitled
to an effective judicial remedy to ensure that they will be able to engage
in the conduct that is protected. If the bare immunity that is relied on
in an enforcement proceeding is not enough, practically speaking,
then more is required. According to this argument, the Constitution
itself requires that inadequate remedies at law be supplemented to
ensure adequate remedial protection. That reasoning does not exactly
64 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323–24 (2019) (holding that an
unconstitutional criminal statutory rule is “no law at all” and is to be disregarded in an
enforcement proceeding).
65 See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311, 316 (1843) (explaining that states may
change contract remedies but may not so restrict remedies as to eliminate the promisee’s
right to performance).
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read equity into the Constitution, but rather reads in an entitlement
to some effective remedy. Declaratory relief at law would be adequate,
for example, but the call for some effective remedy is also a basic
principle of equity.
As that sketch of the issues shows, an important question in cases
like Whole Woman’s Health is about the content of the Constitution, and
the possibility that state or federal rules about equitable remedies
might be inconsistent with the Constitution’s primary rules. Any threat
posed by the power over remedies is to constitutionally protected
interests, not to the separation of powers.
IV.

THE STATUS OF EQUITY AS UNWRITTEN LAW EXTERNAL TO THE
COURTS AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INNOVATION IN EQUITY

This Part addresses a crucial question about federal equity, a
question that arises from equity’s character as a body of legal principles
external to the courts: How substantial must an innovation in equity
be so that only a legislature, and not a court, may permissibly adopt it?
Were federal equity the product of a judicial power to make law
the way legislatures make it, that question would not arise. Courts
could make any change a legislature could make. But although courts
shape unwritten customary law by contributing to the body of custom
and providing explanations of the custom and their applications of it,
they do not have the kind of power over unwritten law that legislatures
have.
American courts have not produced a generally accepted account
of the limits of their authority to innovate in administering the unwritten law. Instead, on this higher-order question concerning custom and
practice, they have proceeded through custom and practice. Courts
have applied the principle that the permissible scope of innovation is
limited in specific contexts, and have not produced a well-established
theory concerning the permissible degree of innovation. Probably the
most famous verbal formulation of the principle is more striking than
useful, as perhaps should not be surprising given its source. Justice
Holmes famously said that courts innovate at the molecular but not the
molar level. Figures of speech are not theory.66
This Article does not present a theory either, but does seek to take
steps toward producing one. I will address the problem of deciding
whether an innovation in remedies law is limited enough so that a
court may properly make that innovation, or is so large that the
66 “I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do
so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” S. Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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innovation should be left to the legislature. Using the method of
building inductively from examples, I will briefly discuss six twentiethcentury cases that are important building blocks of contemporary
public law federal equity. Four of the cases are known landmarks: Ex
parte Young,67 Brown v. Board of Education,68 Baker v. Carr,69 and Goldberg
v. Kelly.70 Another is well known to specialists in administrative law:
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.71 The sixth is not
nearly as famous as it deserves to be: Truax v. Raich.72
To assess the permissible degree of judicial innovation, I identify
three important issues as to which those cases innovated. For each
case, I ask how large an innovative step that case took as to each issue.
The first issue involves questions of what today would be called
standing or the plaintiff’s cause of action—the legal principles that
identify proper parties to seek judicial relief. The second involves
litigation structure—the relations among parties and their legal
interests that are proper for a judicial proceeding. The third issue
involves the scope of equitable remedies—the extent to which a court
may direct the conduct of the defendant, including directing the
policy choices of government entities.
All three issues—causes of action, litigation structure, and courts’
authority to exercise discretion in directing the defendant’s conduct
through an injunction—are of course central to public law litigation
and are subjects of continuing controversy. Universal injunctions, for
example, present problems of litigation structure because they involve
relief that reaches beyond the parties to the case.
The six cases can usefully be put in three groups that reflect the
main ways in which they represented innovation. Young and Truax
made possible new forms of litigation through which the
constitutionality of regulatory statutes could be tested. American School
of Magnetic Healing, Brown, and Goldberg enabled beneficiaries of
government programs to raise constitutional and statutory challenges
to the way in which the government was administering the benefit
programs at issue. Baker enabled voters to bring to court a distinct
67 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
68 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
70 397 U.S. 254, 26163 (1970) (holding that termination of welfare benefits constitutes a deprivation of property that may be accomplished only pursuant to proceedings that
satisfy the Due Process Clause).
71 187 U.S. 94, 111 (1902) (approving an injunction directing the Postmaster General
to deliver mail to the plaintiff, despite the Postmaster General’s finding that the plaintiff’s
business was fraudulent).
72 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (holding that an Arizona restriction on the number of
noncitizens an employer could employ was unconstitutional).
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harm—reduction in the practical power of the franchise by rules of
legislative apportionment—and seek a novel remedy—a judicial order
affecting the drawing of legislative districts.73
I explain that once the issues are understood properly, the most
substantial innovations were in Truax, Brown, and Baker. The other
three put down landmarks that were not far from markers already in
place.
The three larger innovations supply important data concerning
the permissible scope of judicial development. Truax involved principles of so-called third-party standing that have long been controversial
and remain controversial today. After the first few decades after Brown,
the Court drew back from the aggressive steps it had authorized with
respect to judicial control of discretionary government decisions.
After Baker, the Court created a doctrine that limited judicial
discretion in addressing legislative apportionment. All the more
aggressive extensions of federal equity thus provoked enough doubts
and second thoughts to suggest that they were at or near the limits of
permissible judicial innovation.
A. Suits in Which Regulated Parties Seek Injunctions Against the
Institution of Enforcement Proceedings
Twice in the first two decades of the twentieth century the Court
approved forms of proceeding in equity that facilitated challenges to
the constitutionality of statutory regulations of private conduct. Both
cases involved what today would be called economic regulation.
In Ex parte Young, the Court approved a form of equitable relief
that has become a staple of constitutional and administrative law.
Regulated parties, in Young railroads, sued the official responsible for
bringing enforcement proceedings against them.74 In Young the
official was Minnesota Attorney General Edward Young.75 The Court
found that the injunctive proceeding was an appropriate forum in
which the railroads could raise constitutional objections that they
otherwise would raise as defendants in enforcement proceedings.76
In Truax, the Court approved a suit against an enforcement
official to restrain enforcement proceedings, but that suit was not
brought by a regulated party who was a potential defendant. In Truax,

73 Baker, 369 U.S. at 188.
74 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 129 (1908).
75 See id.
76 Id. at 168 (finding that suit to enjoin enforcement proceedings was an appropriate
remedy).
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the regulated party was an employer and the plaintiff was an employee
of that employer.77 Truax thus was a step beyond Young.
Young was a major step, and resolved a hotly contested question,
but the major step and the contest did not involve available remedies
under federal equity. Equity had long provided forms of litigation in
which prospective defendants could sue prospective plaintiffs and raise
the issues that would arise between them were suit brought with the
parties reversed.78 The major step and the contest involved sovereign
immunity, which the Court found did not bar that kind of suit.79
With respect to litigation form, Young involved a familiar
configuration of parties and interests. The case did resolve a novel
issue and so broke some new ground, but the novel issue arose because
of an innovation by the Minnesota legislature, not the Court. The
legislature had adopted an enforcement system with strong penalties.80
Those penalties were designed to keep the railroads from using the
standard mode of constitutional litigation in which a regulated party
violates a statute and raises a constitutional defense.81 Litigating as a
defendant, the Court found, was the equity plaintiffs’ remedy at law.
That remedy was inadequate because of the risk of strong sanctions
were the rates to be upheld in an enforcement proceeding.82
Young also rested on familiar principles concerning parties’
relevant interests and judicial remedies. As regulated parties and
potential defendants, the railroads had two interests that the courts
already respected in enforcement proceedings. In a proceeding to
enforce a regulatory statute, the defendant has an interest in avoiding
the penalties that may be imposed and an interest in being free of the
restriction on liberty of conduct imposed by the regulation. Regulated
parties rely on those same interests in Young-type anticipatory proceedings. In Young the remedy was in form an injunction and in substance
the recognition of a defense. Neither was a new development, and the
77 See Truax, 239 U.S. at 35–36 (describing Arizona law that limited the employment
of noncitizens by employers and Raich’s suit against enforcement officials seeking an
injunction against enforcement proceedings against his employer, Truax, who was aligned
as a defendant along with the enforcing officials).
78 See John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 997–1000 (2008)
(describing longstanding equitable practice that enabled potential defendants at law to
become plaintiffs in equity and present their defenses in equitable proceedings).
79 Id. at 996–97 (describing the sovereign immunity issue in Young). As the Court
explained in Truax, Ex parte Young had resolved the question whether a suit to enjoin
enforcement proceedings was inconsistent with sovereign immunity. Truax, 239 U.S. at 37.
80 See Harrison, supra note 78, at 992.
81 See id. at 991–92 (describing the Minnesota enforcement system).
82 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 164–65 (1908) (finding that the remedy at law of
a defense in an enforcement proceeding was inadequate).
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injunction did not require that the court exercise discretion
concerning the defendant's activities. Young thus involved no major
innovation as to any of the three issues concerning equitable remedies
that I have identified.
Truax was a greater innovation in one respect. The equity plaintiff’s interest was a well-known ground of equitable protection: the
economic interest in employment.83 No judicial discretion as to the
defendant’s conduct was called for, because the question was simply
whether to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
statute.84 The litigation form, however, was novel. Unlike Young, Truax
was not simply an enforcement proceeding with the parties reversed.
The plaintiff sought an injunction against the institution of
enforcement proceedings against someone else—his employer.85
Truax thus did not involve the familiar litigation form in which the
plaintiff presents an argument that would be a defense were the
plaintiff the defendant, nor the familiar litigation form in which the
plaintiff requests an injunction against conduct that was well
understood to be an invasion of property rights.
The Court has never indicated any second thoughts about the
availability of that kind of injunctive relief. Later cases, however,
suggest that Truax does not have much generative force, but instead
rests on controversial premises. In the 1930s, the Court decided
several cases that denied attempts by private parties to raise
constitutional objections to federal programs that imposed economic
harm on them. In those cases, the Court stressed private wrong as the
proper ground of equitable intervention and found that economic
injury caused by an unconstitutional statute was not by itself private
wrong.86 Those cases are not easy to square with Truax, which involved
economic harm but arguably no private wrong. When the Court
became more reluctant to adjudicate constitutional challenges to
regulation, its decisions showed that cases like Truax were on the
border of permissible litigation structures.
Much more recently, the Justices have once again become
troubled by third-party standing as a means to raise constitutional

83 See Truax, 239 U.S. at 38 (pointing to the constitutional protection of the plaintiff’s
right to earn a livelihood).
84 See id. at 39.
85 See id. at 36.
86 See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 467, 470 (1938) (holding that injury
inflicted by lawful competition supported by allegedly unconstitutional federal assistance is
not a private wrong and so does not confer standing to sue the Secretary of the Interior for
an injunction against implementing the program).
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challenges to statutes.87 Their doubts do not suggest any inclination to
reconsider cases like Truax, but they do reflect the understanding that
allowing one party to rely on another’s rights, as the issue is described,
is a substantial and sometimes doubtful step.
B. Suits by Beneficiaries Concerning Public Benefit Programs
In American School of Magnetic Healing, Brown, and Goldberg,
beneficiaries of a public benefit program created by statute claimed
that they were denied benefits unlawfully, and sought injunctions
directing the government to administer the program lawfully. The two
earlier cases involved in-kind benefits: postal services and public
education. Goldberg involved cash benefits. In all three, questions of
sovereign immunity lurked in the record, but those questions are not
relevant to the development of federal equity, as they were not relevant
in Young.88
Except for the presence of a government agency as defendant, the
litigation form in all three cases was standard and required no
innovation. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had a duty to
provide the plaintiff with a benefit and was not doing so, and sought
an injunction directing that the defendant fulfill the duty. In all three
cases, the court easily could conclude that the remedy at law was
inadequate. Enforcement of affirmative duties is as ordinary as specific
performance.

87 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2322–23 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (raising doubts about the Court’s acceptance of third-party
standing as a way to raise constitutional issues).
88 In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court addressed the sovereign
immunity question that the parties had passed over in Goldberg. Edelman is thus the
counterpart to Young with respect to public benefit programs, holding that injunctive relief
concerning such programs is consistent with sovereign immunity. Id. at 673. Although
Edelman’s holding is often understood to rest on the prospective nature of the relief sought,
that account is hard to reconcile with the Court’s opinion. The opinion, seeking to prick
out the line between permissible and impermissible relief against governments, puts
specific performance on the impermissible side. Id. at 666–67 (explaining that not all
equitable relief against state officers is consistent with sovereign immunity and giving
specific performance as an example of an impermissible remedy). Specific performance is
a prospective remedy. A more plausible explanation of the Court's approach is that in cases
involving public benefit programs, the court is not enforcing an unconditional obligation
of the government, like the obligation to pay damages for a past tort or to perform a
contract already made. Rather, in cases like Edelman and Brown, relief is conditional on the
continued operation of the benefit program. While the program is in place, it creates the
equivalent of the kind of private right that the courts have long protected from unlawful
deprivation by government officials.
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A more difficult question involved the plaintiffs’ interests—their
standing or cause of action in contemporary terminology—but while
somewhat difficult, the question took a well-known form. Party A bore
a duty to take an action that would benefit party B. Judge Cardozo
might have asked whether A’s duty ran to B.89 Today, the question
would be whether B has standing or a cause of action. Answering that
question in the affirmative is not a substantial innovation in the law of
equitable remedies. To decide whether the beneficiary of a public
program may sue, the courts apply standard remedies principles to the
relevant primary law.90 Finding that the Postmaster General’s duty to
deliver the mail runs to the persons who send mail is an important
decision, but whether that decision was correct turned on the postal
statutes. Principles of equity do no more than pose the question, as
they pose the question with respect to the welfare program at issue in
Goldberg.
In three of those four cases, the remedy sought was
straightforward, if intrusive, and did not require that the court exercise
much judgment about the administration of a public program. The
American School of Magnetic Healing, for example, asked that the
Postmaster General be directed to deliver the mail.91
One of the cases, though, did lead to remedies in which courts
exercised a great deal of policy judgment about public programs.
Brown produced desegregation orders that were often highly detailed.
Those intrusive decrees proved extremely controversial, not only in
public debate but on the courts themselves. In more recent decades,
the Supreme Court has been much more skeptical of judicial control
of public institutions than it was in the years soon after Brown.92 Rather
than providing an example of a permissible development of federal
equity, the more intrusive desegregation decrees are examples of
discretionary remedies that arguably went beyond the breaking point.
89 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.)
(concluding that the defendant’s duty to take due care did not run to the plaintiff).
90 For example, in the early school segregation case Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 198, 198 (1849), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the
lawfulness of racial segregation in an action on the case brought by the parent of a child
who was entitled to a public education.
91 See Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109 (1902) (describing
plaintiff’s request that the Postmaster General be required to deliver the mail to it).
92 An example of a later case in which the Court was more skeptical of judicial control
of public institutions is Missouri v. Jenkins. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). In that case, the Court
stressed the requirement that remedies in desegregation cases be tailored to undoing the
effects of prior unlawful government decisions. Id. at 98–100 (finding that the district
court’s remedy went beyond the permissible goal of undoing the effects of prior
unconstitutional decisions).
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C. Legislative Apportionment
In Baker v. Carr,93 the Court held that federal courts could
entertain constitutional challenges to apportionment of population
among state legislative districts under the Equal Protection Clause. As
to two of the issues I have identified, Baker was not an innovation. The
courts had long treated the right to vote as a property right, so that
denial of it could give rise to tort damages.94 The litigation form was
quite similar to American School of Magnetic Healing and Brown. A
plaintiff with rights under a public program asked that the program be
administered in a way that respected those rights.
On the third issue, Baker was more of an innovation. Judicial
involvement in districting raised the possibility that courts would be
called on to make the kind of political judgments that legislatures
make in drawing district lines. When it addressed the substance of the
constitutional rules at issue, the Court produced a doctrine that
substantially constrains judicial discretion by focusing on a single
factor in districting. In Reynolds v. Sims,95 the Court found that the
Constitution “requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”96 A requirement that districts be equipopulous eliminates a great many
considerations that may call for the exercise of judicial policy choice.
In later cases, the Court made the doctrine even more mechanical,
with a presumption in favor of districting plans that have no more than
a 10% deviation from strict population equality.97
Most recently, the Court refused altogether to enter the highly
contentious field of partisan gerrymandering. In Rucho v. Common
Cause,98 the Court found that claims based on the use of partisan
considerations in drawing district lines present political questions and
are not within the jurisdiction of the Article III courts.99 The Court
found that none of the tests to identify impermissible political partybased districting met “the need for a limited and precise standard that

93
94

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 482–83 (2d ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888) (1878)
(describing cases in which denial of right to vote by election officials gave rise to an action
for damages).
95 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
96 Id. at 568.
97 See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 578 U.S. 253, 255 (2016)
(applying the presumption that deviations of less than 10% are permissible).
98 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
99 Id. at 2500, 2508.
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is judicially discernible and manageable.”100 The proposed tests lacked
“a solid grounding for judges to take the extraordinary step of
reallocating power and influence between political parties.”101 The
Court drew back from embracing judicial discretion as to the
allocation of power among political parties. The most substantial
innovation concerning equitable remedies in Baker was the Court’s
willingness to allow judges to exercise some discretion on those issues,
and ever since the Court has sought to find limits on the role of equity
courts.
Several of the Court’s landmark cases extending equitable
remedies are quite modest when examined in detail. The three most
substantial extensions—in Truax, Brown, and Baker—developed equity
in ways that were later doubted and cabined. Although no form of
words will capture the actual practice of federal equity on this topic or
any other, it is fair to say that the federal courts move carefully and
interstitially when they innovate. Developments that come closer to
the molar scale have produced controversy and some reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
When Holmes defined the object of the lawyer’s study as “the
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts,”102 he also recognized the difference
between the courts and the sources of law on which they rely.103 Seeing
that difference can be especially difficult when law is unwritten, as is
much of the body of principles governing equitable remedies in
federal court.104 Unwritten equity principles nevertheless are part of
the law the courts apply, and are not the product of judicial legislation.
The Article III judicial power has the same relationship to equity that
it has to the Constitution, treaties, and statutes. That power enables
the federal courts to apply equity, and sometimes to do equity, and
only in that sense is it an equity power.

100 Id. at 2502.
101 Id.
102 Holmes, supra note 41, at 457.
103 Holmes pointed out that “[t]he means of the study are a body of reports, of
treatises, and of statutes” reaching back into history. Id. His inclusion of statutes reflects
the authority of statutory law for the courts.
104 When the Supreme Court sets out the requirements for preliminary relief, for
example, it is usually not interpreting a statute. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (setting out standards for preliminary relief in
nonstatutory federal equity).
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